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Abstract
In 2007-8, Kenya experienced protracted and widespread post-election violence. Mobile phones—and text
messages in particular– were used to spread rumors and to organize violence. Sisi ni Amani Kenya (SNA-K), a
Kenyan non-governmental organization, utilized a combination of traditional and innovative communication
and dialogue approaches to increase civic education and engagement and prevent violence in Kenyan
communities before, during, and after Kenya’s 2013 General Elections. SNA-K developed SMS-based
programming that reached over 65,000 Kenyans with civic education, civic engagement, and violence
prevention text messages throughout the 2013 election cycle. This paper analyzes data from qualitative and
quantitative surveys distributed to samples from SNA-K’s subscriber base. The paper draws insights and
lessons learned that can inform future programming seeking to utilize mobile technology and ICT-based
communications strategies for civic engagement and violence prevention.
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In 2007-8, Kenya experienced protracted and widespread post-election violence. Mobile phones—and text messages in 
particular—were used to spread rumors and organize violence. Sisi ni Amani Kenya (SNA-K), a Kenyan non-governmental 
organization, utilized a combination of traditional and innovative communication and dialogue approaches in order to increase 
civic education and engagement, as well as to prevent violence in Kenyan communities before, during, and after Kenya’s 
2013 General Elections. SNA-K developed SMS-based programming that reached over 65,000 Kenyans with civic education, 
civic engagement, and violence prevention text messages throughout the 2013 election cycle. This paper analyzes data from 
qualitative and quantitative surveys distributed to samples from SNA-K’s subscriber base. The paper draws insights and lessons 
learned that can inform future programming seeking to utilize mobile technology and ICT-based communication strategies for 
civic engagement and violence prevention. 
Key Findings:
Overall, respondents indicated high levels of satisfaction with SNA-K programming. Specifically:
• 96% of respondents said they found the civic education messages “useful” or “very useful.” The majority of these respondents 
cited the utility of the information related to voting and election day as the main reason for their satisfaction. (N=7,347)
• 92% of respondents said that the messages had a positive effect on keeping peace during elections. (N=7,347)
• Everyone who received an SMS about rumors found the messages useful. About 45% of these respondents indicated that 
the messages convinced them not to believe in the rumors. (N=76)
• More than half of the survey respondents who experienced violence and received an SMS indicated that the messages 
promoted peace and had a calming effect, and more than 40% of respondents said they felt the messages actively aided in 
preventing violence. (N=62)
• 45% of respondents said that they forwarded messages to other people often or very often, and 75% of respondents 
forwarded messages at least once. (N=7,347)
• 98% of respondents from the SMS survey said that they would tell a friend to subscribe to SNA-K. (N=7,347)
The survey reveals that, for the SNA-K programming subscriber base, this simple and accessible tool had a far-reaching impact. 
These results demonstrate the power of mobile text messaging. When wielded by trusted institutions, such tools could go a long 
way in reaching out to communities and reassuring them in times of need.
Note: The multiple choice and phone surveys referenced in this study were conducted by Sisi ni Amani Kenya (SNA-K). The 
multiple-choice survey was conducted via SNA-K’s SMS platform. SNA-K Partnerships Manager Kevin Sudi, Programs Officer 
Caleb Njoroge Gichuhi, and independent research consultant Sheline Lugonzo conducted the qualitative phone survey. The 
results of these surveys were coded by an independent academic researcher, Dr. Seema Shah, and by Sun-Ha Hong, a doctoral 
student at the University of Pennsylvania. Shah designed the coding analysis in consultation with Penn.
The analysis and conclusions in this report are written by Seema Shah while the introduction and description of SNA-K’s 
programming are written by SNA-K Founder and former CEO Rachel Brown.
Executive Summary
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Introduction
Following Kenya’s December 2007 Presidential Elections, 
the country experienced protracted post-election violence 
(PEV) that led to the death of over 1,000 individuals and 
the displacement of hundreds of thousands. The violence 
was ended with a power-sharing deal – brokered through 
international mediation by Kofi Annan – which was 
officially signed on February 28, 2008. 
Election-related violence was not new in Kenya, occurring 
previously during the country’s 1992 and 1997 elections; 
however, the scale and extent of the 2007 violence had 
never been seen before. In comparison to previous election-
related violence, the violence in 2007-8 spread over a larger 
geographical area, lasted longer in a concentrated manner, 
and resulted in a greater number of deaths and displaced 
people. 
During the post-election violence, violent actors effectively 
and strategically used new communication media including 
cell phones and especially SMS (Short Message Service, 
or text messages).  Such media were employed to spread 
rumors and inflammatory speech, to encourage revenge, 
and even to plan attacks and the distribution of weapons. 
Academic research has explored the power of SMS during 
Kenya’s 2007-8 PEV. In her research on the role of rumors 
in the Kibera slum during the PEV, Michelle Osborn 
writes that: “Where rumours were once local, taking time 
to percolate outwards and onwards to a broader, national 
audience, the use of high-tech communication, such as 
mobile phones, email, internet websites and weblogs, has 
transformed the pace and range of rumour. Kenya’s local 
rumours now go national in minutes….”1 She further 
explains that, “The use of mobile phone Short Message 
Service (SMS) texts in the circulation of rumours gave them 
an instantaneous spread, contributing to increased anxiety, 
sometimes leading to panic, and, on occasion, motivating 
people to action,” indicating the importance of SMS in 
particular.2 Goldstein and Rotich also analyze the role that 
mobile phones played in spreading rumors and in urging 
1 Michelle Osborn, “Fuelling the Flames: Rumour and Politics in 
Kibera,” Journal of East African Studies 2, no. 2 (July 2008): 315-327, 
p.316.
2 Ibid, pp. 315, 317.
attacks, citing specific examples of messages used to do so.3 
Using the 2007-8 PEV as a case study, the NGO Sisi Ni 
Amani Kenya (SNA-K) worked with local peacebuilders 
from Nairobi’s Eastlands and from Narok to conduct a 
conflict dynamics analysis. With the hope of identifying 
ways to support and increase the effectiveness of local 
peacebuilders, this analysis focused specifically on the ways 
in which violent actors had successfully used communication 
to their advantage. From this analysis, the SNA-K team 
established where local peacebuilders had struggled to 
prevent and end the violence, and how communication via 
mass SMS could help them be more effective. Rumors and a 
general population without the necessary information and 
experience to question rumors (leading to high levels of 
vulnerability to rumors and manipulation) were identified 
as factors that enabled violent actors to be successful and as 
strategically important arenas in which peace actors would 
need to be able to compete. 
This conflict dynamics analysis helped SNA-K identify 
strategic ways in which SMS could be deployed to build 
the capacity of local peace leaders and also reduce the 
population’s vulnerability to rumors and misinformation. 
SNA-K’s team identified SMS as a tool that was used 
particularly well by violent actors.4 SMS was effective 
because it reached people quickly and effectively, especially 
at a time when it was difficult to access other forms of 
information. For example, SNA-K team members noted 
that: 
• “The SMS [text messages] warned us…be vigilant…so 
everyone was prepared” 
• “Some [messages] were inciting…I guess they were 
drafted by an organized lot of people, just to scare 
people”
3 Goldstein, J., and J. Rotich. “Digitally Networked Technology in 
Kenya’s 2007–2008 Post-Election Crisis.” Berkman Center Research 
Publication (2008), p.4
4 At its founding, SNA-K’s team was made up of all volunteers. The 
initial discussion referenced here specifically took place with original 
SNA-K team members from Baba Dogo and Korogocho slums in 
Nairobi over a period of several months. 
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• “The SMS [text] message was used to actually mobilize 
people and collect them in the usual places of meetings. 
This is where they were given the weapons…”5
These three quotes demonstrate the power of SMS to incite 
fear, spread information, and organize action.
SNA-K developed and adapted its approach between 
September 2010 and the March 2013 elections. By the time 
of the March 2013 elections, SNA-K had partnered with 
over fifty local partner organizations and secured in-kind 
support from Kenya’s largest mobile network operator, as 
well as various other funders, to build and operate an SMS 
platform that reached over 65,000 subscribers in more 
than twenty locations. Community members were able 
to subscribe to the platform for free from their phones, 
and SNA-K’s staff recruited and trained local partners to 
conduct community-based subscription outreach in each 
target location.  
Throughout the election cycle, SNA-K monitored the 
situation on the ground and sent voter education, peace 
promotion, and violence intervention messages over 
SMS. These messages provided information on how 
5 These quotes are from SNA-K team members during initial discussions 
and analysis of the use of SMS during the 2007-8 post-election violence. 
community members could participate in the election 
process, encouraged positive behavior, and responded to 
tensions and small-scale violence that occurred in local 
communities. 
Following the March 2013 elections, SNA-K gathered 
feedback from its end users – the more than 65,000 
subscribers – by surveying a sample of subscribers via 
an SMS and a phone-based survey.  The primary goal of 
these surveys was to understand the user experience and 
the impact of the programming. Additional goals included 
uncovering key lessons that could be carried forward 
concerning the potential of SNA-K’s approach to using text 
messages for civic education, engagement, and violence 
prevention; the ways in which this approach could be 
improved; and areas for further research and explanation. 
SNA-K’s SMS-based 
Programming 
Message Creation
SNA-K used a set of behavior chains as the basis for SMS 
creation. These behavior chains outlined a variety of 
scenarios and the steps from communication (i.e. a rumor) 
to violence. The behavior chains, which were created in 
Figure 1
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a series of workshops with SNA-K field teams, created a 
roadmap to identify which messages were needed. For 
example, a behavior chain focused on rumors about theft 
would begin with the initial dissemination of the rumor 
and describe the way in which that rumor could lead to 
violence. The behavior chains broke down each behavior or 
event in between initial dissemination and violence – for 
example the escalation and exaggeration of a rumor and 
people’s reaction throughout the day – and would identify 
the key actors. The chains focused on a variety of specific 
types of events such as cattle theft, rumors of an election 
being stolen, and “they are coming to get us”-type rumors.
The behavior chains enabled SNA-K to both identify highly 
specific types of situations in which messages could be 
useful, and, within these situations, identify different types 
of messages that should be disseminated. Each behavior 
chain was used to identify several points at which messages 
could be sent in the timeline between an event (including 
the start of a rumor), and potential violence. 
SNA-K used behavior chains in combination with a variety 
of other tools. Prior to establishing the behavior chains, 
SNA-K conducted a broader conflict dynamics analysis as 
well as in-depth conflict hot spots analyses. The broader 
conflict dynamics analysis used a tool similar to behavior 
chains: local SNA-K teams mapped out strategies that led 
to peace and/or violence using the metaphor of a soccer 
game. This exercise enabled SNA-K to identify broad types 
of messaging (i.e. civic education messaging, or messages to 
counter a rumor). 
Behavior chains were simple and easy to understand, 
making them useful tools for participatory focus groups. 
Using information discovered from the behavior chains, 
the SNA-K team formed and conducted focus groups with 
target demographic groups.6 These focus groups allowed 
community members to co-create messages in response 
to specific situations and points on the event timelines. 
The behavior chains were used to prompt focus group 
participants to create messages based on a variety of factors 
including: when the rumor was started, how far it had spread 
through the community, whether groups were already 
reacting to the rumor, who was involved, whether there 
6 SNA-K’s staff conducted these focus groups with a variety of 
demographic groups, including young men, young women, older men, 
older women, community leaders, and “information spreaders” (e.g. 
people working in transport or selling things on the side of the road). 
was discussion of arming or violence, and when/if actual 
violence broke out.  Based on the results from these focus 
groups, the SNA-K team developed template messages and 
guidelines to interrupt specific behaviors. A message, for 
example, could attempt to stop people in an outdoor market 
from continuing to spread a rumor or prompt them to ask 
questions about the rumor before spreading it. 
Violence Prevention Messages
SNA-K’s violence prevention messages were created 
through a participatory process with communities that 
drew upon expertise from the field of marketing. First, 
SNA-K utilized the behavior chains to identify relevant 
actors in the community who played key roles in the 
process of moving from information to violence. These 
included direct participants in violence, predominantly 
male youths, as well as a broader collection of players in 
the communication infrastructure in the community, such 
as female vendors, individuals in the transport business, 
opinion leaders, elders, and women. 
SNA-K held focus groups in Nairobi and Narok targeting 
members of each key demographic group. In each focus 
group, participants reviewed the behavior chains for their 
area and made any corrections they believed were needed. 
They were then led in a participatory process to create 
messages that they would send to a peer or would want to 
be sent to them at each step of the behavior chain in order 
to encourage behavior that would prevent violence. For 
example, at the stage in which a rumor was spreading, a 
group might be asked what message would influence them 
or a peer not to spread the rumor, or at least to interrogate it. 
The SNA-K team then worked with a marketing strategist 
from Ogilvy & Mather to analyze the messages that were 
created during these focus groups.7 The marketing strategist 
7 The collaboration between Sisi ni Amani Kenya and Ogilvy & 
Mather was unique and provides an example of unusual cross-sectoral 
collaboration between the peacebuilding field and the private sector. 
The partnership built on the expertise of the marketing industry 
in understanding how to create powerful speakers (brands) and 
influence behavior by understanding the behavior and incentives of 
target audiences. At the same time, the work with SNA-K was able 
to provide the Ogilvy & Mather strategist the opportunity to apply 
his skills to a new challenge. The collaboration was facilitated with 
support from PopTech through the PeaceTXT initiative. 
 This type of cross-sector collaboration can bring high level expertise 
into peacebuilding projects if project implementers are able to 
identify sectors that have needed areas of expertise and make 
compelling arguments about why pro bono or discounted work will 
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showed the SNA-K team how to analyze perceptual, 
behavioral, and contextual drivers and barriers influencing 
the decisions of key target groups. The strategist then 
worked with SNA-K to revise the messages and aided in 
the development of language criteria to manage the risk 
of messages’ unintended effects, as well as to maintain 
the SNA-K brand identity throughout. After this process, 
SNA-K had a spreadsheet of templates and examples based 
on a variety of situations, target groups, and conflict threat 
levels to support messaging development. SNA-K created 
actionable message guidelines on tone, message framing, 
risk management, and relevant drivers and barriers for 
specific target groups and geographic areas. While violence 
and rumor prevention messages were developed for all 
possible anticipated situations, they were sent only in 
response to events reported through SNA-K’s monitoring 
efforts.  
Civic Education Messages
Civic education messages, with a focus on voter education, 
were created based on the need to reduce communities’ 
vulnerability to misinformation and rumors about the 
election process itself. These messages were created 
through joint workshops with community leaders and civic 
educators, such as representatives from the Independent 
Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). Civic 
educators would provide accurate information to common 
questions and areas of confusion about the upcoming 
elections that community members identified. The 
community leaders would then break into groups to create 
SMSs based on the accurate information. These SMSs were 
phrased in language that community members knew their 
community would easily understand. 
The relevant experts, specifically IEBC, then vetted the 
voter education messages before they were sent. While 
IEBC never rejected a message, they vetted the messages for 
accuracy and, when necessary, corrected inaccuracies. This 
was particularly important during the year running up to 
the elections, as there were numerous changes in the way 
the elections would be run. The IEBC was the institution 
be beneficial. Grant Tudor, the strategist with whom SNA-K worked, 
has since founded Populist Group, a new non-profit organization 
dedicated to connecting marketers with social enterprises to bring new 
knowledge, expertise, and create space for innovation into both the 
marketing and social enterprise sectors. Grant’s founding of Populist 
speaks to the potential for cross-sector collaboration to spark new 
long-term collaboration and ideas. 
with the most up to date information about the regulations 
and election preparations. 
The timing of the messages was based on input from the 
community members at the workshop, who would note 
when in the election cycle messages should be sent (i.e. 
that a certain message should be sent the afternoon before 
voting) and how frequently in order to maintain the 
attention of the community. Civic education messages were 
sent prior to the election with frequency ranging from twice 
a day to weekly and at times even less frequently depending 
on the proximity of the election. 
Implementation 
Implementation Strategy
Prior to the elections, SNA-K trained its teams on SMS 
creation based on the frameworks developed by the SNA-K 
field team with support from Ogilvy & Mather. SNA-K’s 
eight field coordinators in Nairobi and nine team members 
in Narok conducted the original focus groups, then each 
spent a full day with the Ogilvy & Mather consultant to 
review the focus group analyses. The teams were then re-
trained on messaging development in a two-day training. 
Approximately 130 SNA-K outreach workers in six target 
locations were given a basic half-day training during 
their SNA-K outreach trainings. SNA-K’s field team and 
partners in the Rift Valley were also given basic training on 
monitoring, verification of information, message creation, 
testing, sending, and feedback. 
SNA-K’s field team (eight full-time staff and ten volunteers) 
was responsible for monitoring and gathering information 
from partners on the ground. Through regular check-ins 
with a headquarters team, SNA-K monitored tensions on 
the ground in the weeks leading up to the election and 
throughout the election period. 
When field team members reported issues of concern, 
they were asked to verify the information, which was then 
reported to relevant authorities for response as needed.8 
8 SNA-K collaborated closely with the National Steering Committee 
on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC), the Kenyan 
government body responsible for early warning and response. The 
NSC had representatives in each County and was connected to the 
security forces for response. When SNA-K received reports that needed 
intervention from security forces or could benefit from the involvement 
of the local NSC Peace Monitor, SNA-K reported to the NSC. For 
example, when SNA-K verified that people were arming in Dandora (a 
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Additionally, the field teams would identify whether or 
not an SMS was needed. If it was, the field teams would 
propose a message based on the message templates and 
guidelines. The message would be tested with community 
members representing different sides of the conflict and 
vetted to ensure that it could not be interpreted as partisan 
or alarmist. Messages would then be approved and sent by 
the headquarters team. This process’s implementation time 
varied. Most messages took only about fifteen minutes to be 
sent, while messages sent in response to highly complicated 
situations took additional time to ensure risk management. 
The headquarters team managed a situation room 
throughout the elections and the following court petition.  
Data and Methodology
After the 2013 Kenyan election period, SNA-K conducted a 
two-phased survey of its subscribers to evaluate how useful 
the messages were and how subscribers used the messages 
in their daily lives. SNA-K designed and conducted both 
phases of the survey, and both phases targeted SNA-K 
subscribers specifically. There was no survey of community 
members who had not subscribed to SNA-K, as both phases 
were conducted by mobile phone in order to reduce costs. 
Additionally SNA-K did not have access to a random 
sample of phone numbers of individuals who had not 
subscribed to SNA-K in each of the target areas. The fact 
that SNA-K designed and implemented the survey and that 
the respondents were all subscribers to SNA-K means that 
there is the potential for response bias in the respondents’ 
feedback. The survey, however, specifically sought to 
understand the experience and feedback of SNA-K 
subscribers in order to evaluate this approach. The response 
bias therefore does not compromise an impact evaluation. 
The survey results were coded by an independent researcher, 
Dr. Seema Shah, and by Sun-Ha Hong, a doctoral student 
from the University of Pennsylvania. The coding analysis 
was designed by Shah in consultation with Penn.
In the first phase survey, conducted in April 2013, all of 
SNA-K’s subscribers received a message inviting them to 
take a free SMS-based survey with the chance to win 250 
KES in mobile phone usage (to be applied to data, SMS, 
and/or phone calls) upon completion. 7,350 subscribers 
slum area in Nairobi), SNA-K reported this to NSC who communicated 
directly to the head of the police force. 
completed the SMS-based multiple-choice survey before it 
was closed. Of those, 7,347 completed the questionnaire in 
full and are included in this analysis. 
In the second phase, conducted in June-July 2013, 
approximately 340 subscribers were surveyed through 
telephone calls. These subscribers were selected through 
a structured random sample drawn from subscribers who 
had not taken the SMS-based multiple choice survey. 
SNA-K structured the random sample based on gender and 
location, randomly selecting male and female subscribers 
from each location to create a sample that was representative 
of the gender and location make-up of the entire subscriber 
database. Subscribers were then randomly selected from a 
spreadsheet.9 
This second phase evaluation included open-ended 
questions meant to give respondents a chance to elaborate 
on their opinions. The final dataset contains the 282 
respondents who were willing to answer questions and who 
did so in full.
OLS regression analysis was conducted using the SMS-
based survey dataset. The dependent variables were the 
respondents’ answers to the five questions, each of which 
was scaled as follows:
• Did you ever have a conversation about a message you 
got from SNA-K?  
• 0=Never
• 1=Once
• 2=Sometimes
• 3=Often
• 4=Very Often
• Did you ever forward a message you got from SNA-K?
• 0=Never
• 1=Once
• 2=Sometimes
• 3=Often
• 4=Very Often
9 The number of total subscribers in a spreadsheet (i.e. women from 
a certain location or men from a certain location) was divided by 
the number of subscribers that needed to be randomly selected. 
The number resulting from that division was then used and every 
subscriber whose row was a multiple of that number in the spreadsheet 
was selected as part of the sample. 
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• Did SNA-K’s SMS have a positive, negative or no impact 
on keeping peace during the election? 
• 1=Positive
• 0=No Impact
• -1=Negative
• Would you tell a friend to subscribe to SNA-K? (logit 
regression used for this question)
• 1=Yes
• 0=N0
• Were SNA-K’s messages useful to help you better 
understand how to vote? 
• 2=Very Useful
• 1=Useful
• 0=Neither
• -1=Useless
• -2=Very Useless
The independent and dummy variables included gender, 
employment status, and region. 
Responses from the telephone survey were also coded 
and analyzed. Two data analysts coded responses to the 
questions as follows:
1. If you received a civic education SMS from SNA-K and 
found it useful (or not useful), please explain why. Answers 
were coded as dummy variables if they fell into one of the 
following categories:
• General comments about how the messages provided 
electoral process knowledge/made things easier/helped 
me by providing information
• Messages were helpful in educating me about ballot 
box colors/ballot procedures, etc
• Messages were helpful because they enabled peaceful 
voting
• Messages were useful because they could be shared 
with others and/or used to teach others
• Messages were helpful because they were always on my 
phone so I could check the information when I needed 
it, even at the polling station
• Messages were not helpful because I already knew the 
information provided
• Other
2. If you heard rumors and received a SNA-K SMS, please 
explain why you believe/do not believe it had an impact. 
Answers were coded as dummy variables if they fell into 
one of the following categories:
• Messages calmed people down (who were anxious or 
who were inclined towards getting angry/agitated/
suspicious)/encouraged people to remain calm AND 
messages helped me be peaceful
• Messages encouraged us to have faith in the electoral 
commission
• Messages convinced people not to believe the rumors
• Messages were useful because I could forward them to 
others
• Other
3. If you did not hear rumors but you did receive a SNA-K 
SMS, please explain why you believe/do not believe it had an 
impact. Answers were coded as dummy variables if they fell 
into one of the following categories:
• Messages calmed people down/reduced anxiety/
encouraged people to remain calm
• Messages encouraged peace/promoted peace/
reminded us to be peaceful
• Messages convinced people not to believe the rumors
• Messages were useful because I could forward them to 
others/could use them to preach to or teach others
• Messages were not useful
• Other
4. If there was conflict in your area and you received a SMS 
from SNA-K, please explain why you believe/do not believe it 
had an impact. Answers were coded as dummy variables if 
they fell into one of the following categories:
• Messages made people feel like they were being 
watched so they were less likely to commit violence/
made people feel like someone was “monitoring” or 
“watching” or “in charge,” which helped create feeling 
of safety/security
• Messages encouraged people to stay calm/to calm 
down if they were scared/to be peaceful/remember to 
be peaceful/helped maintain peace
• Messages were forwarded to others/shared with others
• Messages prevented people from joining violence (they 
should say explicitly that they didn’t join or stopped 
thinking of joining because of the messages)
• Other
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5. If you did not experience conflict but you received a SMS 
from SNA-K, please explain why you believe/do not believe it 
had an impact Answers were coded as dummy variables if 
they fell into one of the following categories:
• Messages helped keep people calm/encouraged peace/
promoted peace/maintained peace
• Messages prevented the escalation of tension into 
violence/prevented violence 
• Messages were forwarded to others/shared with others/
used to preach or teach others 
• Messages reminded us that we can live together in 
peace/reminded us we are all Kenyan/reminded us to 
think of our communities and value our communities
• Messages were helpful during times when there was 
nowhere else to turn for answers
• Other
6. Do you think SNA-K SMSs contributed anything during 
elections? Answers were coded as dummy variables if they 
fell into one of the following categories:
• Unsure/Don’t Know
• Messages contributed to peace/made people remain 
calm/promoted peace/encouraged peace
• Messages provided education/information about 
elections
• Messages were nonpartisan and embraced everything/
messages were trusted
• Messages were forwarded/shared and helped more 
people
• Messages helped to prevent/contain violence (only use 
this if they explicitly say that it helped prevent violence 
– if they say something that could be interpreted as 
messages calmed people, put it in the above “calm” 
category. In other words, don’t infer that being made 
calm prevented violence)
• Other
• No Explanation Given: for those who said messages 
contributed something but didn’t specify what that 
something was.
7. Would you want to be receiving more SNA-K messages in 
the future? Why or why not? Answers were coded as dummy 
variables if they fell into one of the following categories:
• Provides useful education on elections (related to civic 
education, voter education)
• Peace is a good thing and the messages bring peace
• Messages were helpful (in a general sense) (references 
to messages providing unspecified information should 
go here)
• I can forward the messages
• I want to learn about peace
• I am a peacebuilder/I want to promote peace (as in this 
is a tool I can use for my work)
• I want to know about my country
• I want to receive messages on other issues
• Don’t Know
• Other
If no, why not:
• Elections are over so I don’t need the SMS messages 
anymore
• There is peace now
These two datasets provide the basis for the following 
analysis. 
SMS and Phone Survey Data
The SMS-based survey revealed that SNA-K was active in 
the following regions:
Table 1: Regional Breakdown of SMS Survey
Region Percent in Survey
Central Province 3.2%
Coast 2.0%
Eastern Province 1.4%
Nairobi 25.1%
Northeastern Province .2%
Nyanza Province 12.9%
Rift Valley Province 44.5%
Western Provicne 1.7%
Unidentified region 9.0%
Additionally, this set of respondents consisted of 31.2% 
women, 58.9% men and 9.9% unidentified gender. 
Respondents’ employment status was also recorded, but 
many users did not respond. The breakdown is 4.2% 
employed, 8.0% unemployed, 1.8% students, and 87.7% of 
unknown employment status. 
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The demographic breakdown of the telephone survey is as 
follows:
Table 2: Regional Breakdown of Telephone Survey
Region Percent in Survey
Central Province 0
Coast 0
Eastern Province .7%
Nairobi 75.5%
Northeastern Province 1.1%
Nyanza Province 0
Rift Valley Province 17.7%
Western Provicne .7%
Unidentified region 4.3%
52.5% of these respondents were male and 35.5% were 
female; 12.1% were of unidentified gender.  As in the SMS 
survey, many of the telephone survey respondents did not 
respond to questions about employment. 35.4% of the 
users were employed, 12.4% were unemployed, 5.0% were 
students, and 46.8% did not respond.
The database of both SMS and phone survey respondents 
also included age, but because of changes in the USSD-
based subscription process, which was changed over time 
to adapt to the response from the community, the age 
brackets changed several times. As such, the inconsistent 
age categories make it impossible to use this age data in a 
meaningful way. 
Civic Education
One of SNA-K’s roles in the 2013 electoral cycle was to 
assist in the provision of voter education. Voter education 
was especially critical in this election cycle, because the 
new constitution and host of legal reforms in the lead-up 
to the General Election meant that voters would be exposed 
to a number of new procedures at the polling station. New 
procedures included electronic voter identification and 
simultaneous voting for six elective offices (four of which 
were newly created under the 2010 constitution). Voter 
education also included important new information about 
what voters would need to show for identification at the 
polling station and how to find polling stations. Given 
the late roll out10 of IEBC’s voter education program and 
the commissions delayed preparations,11 efforts made by 
SNA-K and other civil society organizations were especially 
important. In fact, observers from the European Union 
noted the low impact of the IEBC’s efforts in this regard: 
“High quality civic education manuals were produced but, 
at such a late stage of election preparations, this was not 
likely to have achieved any significant impact on levels of 
awareness about governance and the elected posts.”12
It is thus not surprising that SNA-K’s SMS survey 
respondents indicated a high level of satisfaction with voter 
education messages. 96% of respondents said they found 
the messages “useful” or “very useful,” while only 2% of 
respondents said that they found the messages “useless” or 
“very useless” (see figure 2).  
These sentiments were echoed in the telephone survey. 96% 
of those respondents who did receive a voter education SMS 
said that they found the messages useful.  Of those who 
said the messages were useful, 66.8% said the reason was 
the utility of the information related to voting and election 
day. Almost 15% of respondents specifically cited the SNA-
K’s information explaining the color coding of ballots and 
ballot boxes (see figure 3). Of those who said the messages 
were not useful, more than 80% said it was because they 
already had the information that was provided in the SMS. 
Overall, people clearly appreciated SNA-K’s voter education 
information. One respondent said that he “didn’t have any 
idea how to mark the ballot papers” before the SMS, and 
many respondents indicated that the messages helped clarify 
points about which they were unsure. Another respondent 
said, “[The messages] enabled me to vote wisely since I felt 
empowered with the information and am proud that I kept 
peace. [I] am a youth and I felt enlightened on what was 
going on and am thankful.” Given these positive responses, 
the IEBC and civil society organizations that carry out 
civic/voter education might consider the use of mobile 
text messages as a low-cost and effective way of providing 
critical election-related information to the public.13 
10 The Carter Center. 2013. “Observing Kenya’s March 2013 National 
Elections,” 29.  
11 For details on the multiple pre-election delays, see The Carter Center’s 
and the European Union’s final election observation reports. 
12 European Union Election Observation Mission to Kenya. 2013. “Final 
Report,” 13. 
13 The IEBC sent a small number of SMS to all Safaricom mobile 
subscribers around the most key voter education issues, but it was not 
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Were SNA-K’s messages useful to help you better understand how to vote?  
(N=7,347)
Very useful
Useful
Neither (2%)
Useless (1%)
Very useless (1%)
83%
13%
Figure 2
Results also show that there is a statistically significant 
correlation between Kenyans in Nairobi and Rift Valley and 
the perceived level of the messages’ utility. That is, those in 
Nairobi and the Rift Valley were statistically more likely to 
find the messages useful in understanding how to vote. This 
is not to say that respondents elsewhere did not find the 
an opt-in service and the number of messages that could be sent was 
limited. 
messages useful. There was a positive correlation between 
all regions and message utility, but statistical significance 
existed only for Nairobi and Rift Valley. More research is 
needed to explore the reasons behind the correlation, but it 
could be that residents in these areas were less exposed to 
other voter education programs and were therefore more in 
need of information. 
In what ways were the civic education messages useful? (N=256)
Provided electoral process knowledge
Claried ballot and ballot box color coding
Enabled peaceful voting
I could share the message with others
I could refer to the info anywhere because
it was on my phone (2%)
Other
56%
12%
7%
12%
11%
Figure 3
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Table 3: Impact of Gender, Employment and Region on 
Respondents’ Opinions Regarding SNA-K Programming
Frequency of Conversation
Central Province .256***  (.092)
Frequency of Conversation
Rift Valley Province .075**  (.033)
Frequency of Forwarding Messages
Gender .116***(.039)
Frequency of Forwarding Messages
Employment .211**  (.107)
Frequency of Forwarding Messages
Central Province .303*** (.100)
Belief in Impact of Messages
Nyanza Province -.047*** (.015)
Belief in Impact of Messages
Rift Valley Province .056*** (.010)
Belief in Utility of Messages
Nairobi Province .057*** (.016)
Belief in Utility of Messages
Rift Valley Province .032**(.014)
** 95% Confidence
*** 99% Confidence
Keeping Peace
SNA-K’s second primary role in the 2013 Kenyan election 
cycle was to promote peace and prevent violence. In fact, 
SNA-K joined a large number of civil society groups, 
businesses, politicians, political institutions, and others in 
advocating for peace in the lead-up to the polls.  Unlike 
many players in this “peace industry,” as it came to be known, 
SNA-K used its expertise to craft specifically targeted and 
timely messages, which interacted with and responded to 
conditions on the ground. This approach helped SNA-K 
stand out from the crowd, as many other organizations 
either engaged in self-censorship or used much more 
vague messaging to urge all Kenyans to “vote peacefully.” 
In Nairobi, for instance, the paint company known as 
Duracoat issued advertisements that read, “Vote for Peace.” 
The IEBC aired similar advertisements, urging Kenyans to 
“vote peacefully.” One analyst noted the following:
One of Kenya’s paint manufacturers ran ads calling for 
brightly colored “peace, love, unity.” Graffiti artists used lots 
of paint to spray peace murals on public walls in Nairobi. 
Religious leaders appealed for peace and prayer, on huge 
billboards and on the radio. Kenyan journalists conducted 
no exit polls, chose not to air Odinga’s first post-election 
news conference live (in case he made inflammatory 
remarks), repeatedly urged the public to remain calm and 
patient, and showed so much of their own patience with 
the hapless electoral commission that they have since been 
criticized for being too gentle…14
The well-known international journalist Michela Wrong 
described the Kenyan media’s preoccupation with keeping 
peace in this way:
It sometimes feels as though a zombie army has taken up 
position where Kenya’s feisty media used to be, with local 
reporters going glaze-eyed through the motions… The 
Kenyan media’s self-restraint reveals a society terrified 
by its own capacity for violence…Shortly before handing 
Uhuru his winner’s certificate, the chairman of the election 
commission congratulated the Kenyan media on their 
“exemplary behavior.” As he did, the screen above his head 
was showing figures that did not add up.15
It does appear that SNA-K’s approach struck a chord with 
respondents. When asked whether they thought SNA-K’s 
messages had a positive or negative impact on keeping 
peace, respondents to the SMS survey overwhelmingly 
indicated that the messages had a positive effect. 92% of 
the SMS survey respondents said that the messages had a 
positive impact on keeping peace during elections, while 
4% said the messages had a negative impact, and 4% said 
they had no impact at all (see figure 4). 
Fighting Rumors to Keep the Peace
The telephone survey also showed largely positive results in 
regards to keeping the peace.
14 Benesch, Susan. 2013. “The Kenyan Elections: Peace Happened.” 
Huffington Post. Available at < http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-
benesch/kenya-elections_b_2921096.html>.
15 Wrong, Michela. 2013. “To be Prudent is to be Partial.” The New York 
Times. Available at <http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/
erring-on-the-side-of-caution-kenyas-media-undercovered-the-
election/>.
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First, SNA-K sent messages to counter election-related 
rumors. Some of these rumors had the potential to incite 
suspicion and possibly violence. For example, respondents 
described hearing rumors of stolen votes, BVR machines 
being used to rig results, celebrations in certain areas before 
results had even been announced, and of people arming 
themselves. One respondent said,
On the culmination of [the] election, the Kikuyus were 
spreading rumors that CORD will win but won’t be given 
the presidency, just like 2007.
Other respondents said they heard that:
If Kenyatta won we will have to move from the houses and 
rent will increase, and if Raila loses there will be war.
The Luos were moving from the community in the fear that 
they [would] be beaten by the Kikuyus after the elections.
SNA-K’s efforts to counter rumors were effective. All of those 
who received messages related to rumors found them to be 
useful. More than half said they were useful because they 
promoted calm and peace. One respondent said, “When I 
heard about the people arming themselves, I was very afraid 
because I am not of the same tribe as they are; but when I got 
the messages telling me not to listen to rumors I was calm, at 
least for a while.” Strikingly, about 45% of respondents who 
heard rumors and received an SMS said they were useful 
because it convinced them not to believe in the rumors 
that were in circulation. This is an important finding, as it 
demonstrates the power of SNA-K to effectively counter 
the kind of fear- and hate-inciting rumors that fed previous 
cycles of election violence. It is also interesting to note that 
18% of respondents said the messages were useful, because 
they promoted faith in the IEBC. In fact, some respondents 
specifically said that the messages encouraged them to wait 
for the IEBC to announce final results before jumping to 
conclusions. This indicates the power of the constitutional 
reforms that were implemented in the lead-up to the 
2013 election. In particular, it shows how critical the new 
election commission was and how Kenyans believed in the 
credibility of that institution.
Spreading Peace Messages to Conflict-Impacted Areas
Perhaps the most important indicator of the impact of SNA-
K’s peace promotion efforts is the opinion of those who 
actually experienced election-related conflict. 
This group was not large (23.4% of the phone sample), but 
100% of those who witnessed conflict and received a SNA-K 
message reported that the messages had an impact (see 
figure 6a). More than half of the phone sample respondents 
(51.6%) said that the messages promoted peace and had a 
calming effect, and 40.3% of respondents said they believed 
the messages actually prevented violence. This is a critical 
finding, as it indicates that people believe that such tactics 
can actually stop the escalation of tensions into violence 
and proactively dissuade people from participating in acts 
of violence. Civil society organizations, political institutions 
What was SNA-K’s impact on keeping peace during the elections? (N=7,347)
Positive
Negative
No impact
92%
4% 4%
Figure 4
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and even security forces could consider using similar 
messages for violence prevention in future elections.
Of those who did not experience election-related conflict 
but did receive a SNA-K message about conflict, 100% 
believed that the message had an impact (see figure 6b). The 
most commonly cited reason (72%) why people believed in 
the messages’ impact was their ability to calm people down 
and encourage people to keep the peace. 17% of respondents 
said that the messages actively prevented violence, and 18% 
said that the messages reminded subscribers that it was 
possible to live together as one community. 
SNA-K messages were clearly able to help SNA-K subscribers 
to avoid conflict and remain calm. 
Kenyans’ Interactions with 
SNA-K Messages
The SMS survey responses show that SNA-K users did much 
more than simply consume messages. In fact, a clear majority 
of respondents in the SMS-based survey sample (56%) 
indicated that they had conversations about the messages 
often or very often (see figure 7). 45% of respondents said 
that they forwarded messages to other people often or very 
often with 75% of respondents forwarded messages at least 
once. (see figure 8) These actions indicate that SNA-K’s 
reach was potentially much larger than its >65,000-strong 
subscriber base. It is probable that SNA-K messages were 
consumed by members of many subscribers’ personal 
networks. These responses also suggest that Kenyans believe 
in the value of the messages. It is reasonable to assume that 
people would only forward messages (especially at a cost) 
if they believed in the inherent value of the content. The 
respondents’ willingness to share and converse about the 
messages might also indicate that Kenyans are hungry for 
this type of information and education.  
Statistical analysis revealed that Kenyans in Central 
province were more likely to have conversations about the 
SNA-K messages and forward those messages to others. 
Interestingly, there is no statistically significant relationship 
between Kenyans in Central province and their rating of 
how useful SNA-K was. Residents in the Rift Valley were 
also more inclined  to have conversations about SNA-K 
messages, believe that the messages had an impact, and 
that SNA-K programming was useful. Given that Rift Valley 
experienced some of the worst violence in 2008 and that 
tensions were high there in the lead-up to the 2013 poll, this 
finding is not surprising.
Overall Impact of SNA-K
Results from both datasets indicate that SNA-K 
programming mattered to those who subscribed and that 
subscribers would like to continue to benefit from it. 98% of 
respondents from the SMS survey said that they would tell a 
friend to subscribe to SNA-K. 
Figure 5
In what ways were the rumor-related messages useful?
Messages calmed people down
Messages promoted faith in the IEBC
Messages convinced me to to believe the
rumors
I could forward/share the messages
Other
57%
12%
18%
18%
45%
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In what ways did SNA-K messages make an impact (for those who 
experienced conict?) 
(N=62)
Messages made me feel like someone 
was watching me
Messages promoted peace
Messages could be forwarded/shared
Messages prevented violence
Other
40%
10%
4%
16%
31%
If you did not experience conict but you did receive a SNA-K SMS, please
explain why you think
it had an impact
(N=162) 
Promote peace/Calm people own
Prevented violence
I could forward/share messages
Reminded us that we can live together
as one
Other
54%
13%
10%
13%
10%
A
B
Figure 6
A similar proportion of respondents from the telephone 
survey (97%) said that they felt the messages made a 
contribution, and they provided a range of reasons (see 
figure 9). More than 40% said that they felt SNA-K messages 
promoted peace and were effective in calming people down. 
A further 6% said they believed the messages prevented 
violence or prevented the escalation of tension into violence. 
7% said that they felt the messages were useful because they 
provided civic education and related information on voting.
When asked whether they would like to continue to 
receive SNA-K messages, 93% of respondents replied in the 
affirmative. Almost one quarter of the respondents (24%) 
said it was because they believed the messages brought 
peace/encouraged peace. 16% said they wanted more 
messages because they were generally helpful, and the same 
proportion said it was because they could forward and/or 
share the messages with others (see figure 10). Of those 
who did not want to keep receiving SNA-K messages (7%), 
respondents said either that the elections were over or that 
there was now peace. This indicates that people who wish to 
stop receiving the messages were not necessarily dissatisfied 
with them. Rather, they believe that the messages are only 
relevant during elections and/or times of conflict.
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Did you ever forward a message you received from SNA-K? (N=7,347)
Never
Once
Sometimes
Often
Very often
25%
16%
24%
22% 13%
Figure 8
Did you ever have a conversation about a message you received from
SNA-K?
Very often
Often
Sometimes
Once
Never
30%
26%
15%
10%
19%
Figure 7
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In what ways did SNA-K messages make a contribution? (N=273)
Messages promoted peace and calmed people down
Messages provided civic education
Messages prevented violence
Other
No explanation given42%
45%
12%
7%
6%
Figure 9
Why would you like to keep receiveing SNA-K messages? (N=263)
Peace
Helpful
Forward/Share
I am a peacebuilder
I want to know about my country
I want to receive messages about other issues
Other
Education
24%
16%
11%
33%
16%
6%
9%
5%
Figure 10
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Conclusion
SNA-K’s survey aimed to understand users’ experiences 
and identify what aspects of SNA-K’s approach could be 
carried forward..
Based on evidence from subscriber feedback, SNA-K 
programming was an effective tool for voter education and 
peacebuilding in the 2013 Kenyan election cycle. Subscribers 
indicated that SNA-K messages helped to provide critical 
election-related information, promote peace, and even 
helped to prevent acts of violence. For some, SNA-K was 
the sole source of voter information, and for others it was 
the only actor encouraging communities to ignore rumors 
and remain calm. 
Two conclusions and results of SNA-K’s efforts are 
particularly strong and could be useful for future election 
cycles. First, it is clear that SNA-K’s voter education messages 
were useful, timely, and appreciated by subscribers. Such 
messaging throughout the electoral cycle could go a long 
way in providing education and helping to create a more 
knowledgeable and engaged citizenry. Second, it is clear that 
users feel that one of the most useful aspects of the messages 
is their ability (or their perceived ability) to prevent violence 
and maintain calm. Given this, it would be worth thinking 
about how other institutions and organizations could use 
mobile phone messaging to spread calm and peace during 
times of tension. Kenya’s new constitutional dispensation 
creates several new institutions tasked with monitoring hate 
speech and promoting diversity. These bodies could use a 
platform similar to that of SNA-K to disseminate their own 
messages and findings.
It is remarkable that such a simple and accessible tool had 
such a far-reaching impact.  In fact, the results demonstrate 
the power of mobile text messaging. When wielded by 
trusted institutions, such tools could go a long way in 
reaching out to communities and reassuring them in times 
of need. 
It is important to remember that the opinions reflected in 
this report are drawn solely from the SNA-K subscriber 
database. In the future, it would be helpful to conduct a 
randomly controlled study in order to determine just how 
effective such messaging is when sampling both subscribers 
and non-subscribers. It would also be useful to investigate 
the mechanism(s) that appear to have promoted feelings of 
calm and peace. Were SNA-K’s messages effective because 
SNA was seen to be an impartial source of information? 
How were SNA messages different from other peace 
messaging, and why were they more or less useful? Perhaps 
most critically, it would be useful to delve more deeply into 
the reasoning behind statements that indicated that the 
messages prevented violence. What was it about these types 
of messages that could convince people on the ground to 
actively turn away from violence? More detail about the 
circumstances around these responses could illuminate 
important pathways of behavior change and such findings 
could be useful well beyond the world of Kenyan elections.
